In November 2017, Bankman-Fried established his cryptocurrency hedge firm Alameda Research. While leasing office space in Berkeley, California. Bankman-Fried, the descendant of two Stanford law professors. Attended MIT, joined the famed quantitative trading company Jane Street Capital. And entered the cryptocurrency market with Gary Wang, another MIT alum.
Alameda Research operated as an arbitrage firm. Buying bitcoin from one exchange for less money and selling it for more money at another. Bankman-Fried and Wang were able to make a fortune from what was known as "the kimchi exchange". Because of price discrepancies between South Korea and the rest of the globe.
In April 2019, Bankman-Fried, Wang, and Nishad Singh. A recent graduate of U.C. Berkeley, established FTX.com. A global cryptocurrency exchange that provided users with cutting-edge trading capabilities. A responsive interface, and a dependable experience.
Federal watchdogs at the CFTC claim that within a month of establishing FTX.com. Bankman-Fried was using client funds. Especially client personal bitcoin deposits, for Alameda's own wagers, "unbeknownst to anyone except a tiny group of insiders.".
Rehypothecation is the word for the authorised speculative and investment. Use of client assets by enterprises. Customers had not given Bankman-Fried permission to wager with their money. He, or Alameda, was prohibited from utilizing client money. For any purpose under FTX's own conditions of usage. Unless the consumer gave their consent.
Additionally, FTX had a large amount of consumer money from the beginning. The CFTC referenced 2019 data from FTX. Which estimated that the daily volume of futures alone often exceeded $100 million.
According to the CFTC, Alameda committed fraud by using consumer funds for its wagers. Bankman-Fried was also charged with criminal fraud in the Southern District of New York. Where he was indicted by a grand jury. Regulators assert that Bankman-Fried used consumer monies. To finance his speculative bets from the very beginning of FTX.
The former king of cryptocurrency. Who was heralded as the industry's saviour only two months before has fallen from favor .Bankman-Fried will now present himself to the U.S. extradition procedure on Monday. When he returns to American territory, a criminal trial is waiting for him.
Requests for comment from Bankman-lawyers Fried. And the lawyers for his previous company were not immediately fulfilled. A Bankman-Fried spokesman refused to comment.
The Alameda-FTX empire soon grew when the company introduced its own token. FTT, in July 2019 and attracted an equity investment from Binance in November of the same year.
According to the CFTC filing, by 2021, FTX and its subsidiaries will hold assets. Worth around $15 billion, represent 10% of all digital transactions worldwide. And settle $16 billion in daily client trades.
According to the SEC, the company's "years-long" scam included. More than gambling with customers' money.
FTX was able to run so, clear such a large volume, and spark such interest. In conventional finance. A DMM is a company that buys and sells securities to and from consumers in the hopes of making a profit on any price differential.
Alameda has been the exchange's market maker since FTX's start in 2019. Buying and selling cryptocurrencies there. The beneficial connection between FTX and Alameda. Served the interests of Bankman-expanding Fried's empire.
As FTX developed, other market makers went live to provide liquidity. The SEC claims that Alameda was and continues to be FTX's top liquidity supplier. Facilitating platform operation under "Bankman-direction." Fried's
Alameda was equipped with a variety of potent instruments. As opposed to those other market makers or power users.
Because Bankman-Fried instructed his staff at FTX to write an exception into the exchange's code in August 2019.
According to the SEC complaint. "A negative balance could not have been authorised for any other customer account at FTX." to carry out transactions. Alameda was reportedly backed by client assets due to the negative balance.
In a read interview, Caroline Ellison, a former CEO of Alameda, made a passing reference to this.
Stop losses are something that we don't often experience, according to Ellison.
A stop-loss order helps traders in conventional finance reduce their exposure to a lost deal. To halt losses from getting out of hand. A stop-loss order will sell off an asset (a stock, for instance). When it hits a lower limit that has been specified in advance.
Regulators claim that Bankman-Fried worked to stack the deck in Alameda's favor. After receiving what would amount to a "limitless" line of credit from investors. Who were his own clients
FTX provided access to an API for power users. Allowing them to connect with the company's back-end systems. Without using the front-end platform. Common sense checks. Such as making sure there was enough money in their account. Were still required of regular customers.
According to the CFTC. Alameda traders had access to a fast lane that allowed them to bypass other users. And reduce the time it took to execute a deal by "several milliseconds." That was very helpful for the high-frequency trading that FTX customers did.
a bad cryptocurrency hedge fund
Despite the fact that everything was in Alameda's favor. The hedge fund provided poor returns. Even though FTX executives boasted about how successful the trading arm was in public pronouncements. A court document revealed that Alameda lost more than $3.7 billion during the course of its existence.
Alameda's losses and financing arrangement had a significant role in the ultimate collapse of FTX.
Alameda didn't only gamble with customers' money . The hedge fund took out loans from many lenders. Including BlockFi Lending and Voyager Digital. Both of those businesses filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy this year. FTX had both on its radar for buying.
Alameda used FTT tokens that FTX created on its own to guarantee. The loans it received from Voyager and BlockFi. Only a tiny fraction of the FTT was in circulation at any one time; the great bulk of the available cash was under the hands of Bankman-empire. Fried's
The CFTC asserts in its lawsuit that Alameda ought to have admitted that its tokens couldn't be sold for the amount they said they were worth.
This was due to the fact that Alameda held a significant portion of the available supply. So any move by Alameda to sell off its FTT tokens would depress FTT's price.
Alameda reported its whole stockpile of FTT as being worth the going rate, while not marking its tokens to market.
In addition to Solana and Serum (a token developed and pushed by FTX and Alameda). Alameda employed a similar tactic with other currencies to use them as collateral. For billions in loans to other crypto players. These tokens were even known as "Sam coins" among industry insiders.
After the demise of Luna. A stablecoin whose fall decimated other lenders drove crypto values tumbling. The tables were turned. Voyager is one of the largest lenders to Alameda. The remaining lenders, including Alameda. Started issuing margin calls or closing open positions with clients.
According to the CFTC, Alameda saw "a significant amount of margin calls and loan recalls" during May and June 2022.
Investors, lenders, and regulators were unaware that Alameda lacked the liquid assets necessary to pay off its debt.
Although Bankman-Fried and the exchange had informed consumers. That they were the exchange's first priority. Alameda was illiquid while FTX's clients were not.
Bankman-Fried, the fraudster who was uncovered. Left his job as Alameda Research's CEO in October 2021. But according to authorities, he kept in control.
Alameda is said to have received a directive from Bankman-Fried. To enhance the utilisation of client assets while depleting its "unlimited" credit line at FTX.
The CFTC statement states that Alameda was able to carry out these substantial withdrawals. Which totaled several billion dollars in notional value. Thanks to its hidden ordinary-course access to FTX credit and client cash.
Alameda owes unknowing FTX customers almost $8 billion by the middle of 2022. Bankman-Fried had testified before the House that FTX had best risk management and compliance systems. But the company's own bankruptcy papers show that it had no record-keeping capabilities.
The first domino finally fell on November 2. Details about Alameda's balance sheet. Which indicated $14.6 billion in assets, were made public by the cryptocurrency trade magazine CoinDesk. Over $7 billion of such assets were either FTT tokens or currencies backed by Bankman-Fried, such as Serum or Solana. Two billion dollars more were stashed away in equities investments.
The clandestine inner workings of Alameda Research were disclosed for the first time ever to be a contemporary Potemkin town. Investors started selling their FTT tokens and removing their holdings from FTX. Which might be disastrous for Bankman-Fried.
Alameda still had billions of dollars in outstanding collateralized loans. But if the value of their security, FTT, dropped too much, its lenders would issue new margin calls and demand full repayment of the loans.
Allegedly, without access to client cash. Alameda had previously been unable to meet loan commitments throughout the summer. Alameda and FTX now faced a liquidity crisis as money began to flow out of the exchange and FTT's price started to decline.
Bankman-Fried continued to assert that FTX was financed and that client assets were secure in a since-deleted tweet. The split, however, developed into a chasm on November 6 as a result of an old investor turned opponent, Changpeng "CZ" Zhao. This occurred four days after the CoinDesk report.
Binance, which Zhao launched in 2017, was the first outside investor in FTX and provided funds for a Series A round in 2019. By July 2021, it had sold its stake, the same year that FTX had received $1 billion from renowned investors including Sequoia Capital and Thoma Bravo.
Zhao claims that FTX acquired Binance using a mix of BUSD, BNB, and FTT.
Binance's exchange-issued stablecoin, BUSD, is anchored to the dollar's value. Similar to FTX's FTT, Binance's exchange token, or BNB, is used to pay transaction and trading fees on the exchange.
With a tweet stating that "recent discoveries that have come [sic] to light. We have chosen to liquidate all remaining FTT on our books," Zhao slammed the hammer.
Executives at FTX worked to minimise any harm. Ellison reacted to Zhao's offer to buy the remaining FTT tokens from Binance for $22 each.
According to the CFTC petition, Bankman-Fried instructed Alameda traders to provide funds. "for FTT buybacks" by liquidating Alameda's holdings and positions. In an attempt to keep Ellison's level of public support at $22, Bankman-Fried was getting ready to bet the house.
Two days of resistance from Alameda traders kept the price of FTT at approximately $22.
, Bankman-Fried carried on as though everything were OK. FTX is good. Assets are OK, he wrote in a now-deleted tweet on November 7. Bankman-Fried said that all redemptions will be handled and that FTX did not invest customer money.
However, prosecutors claim that while Bankman-Fried was tweeting promises. Executives were getting more concerned about the rising shortage . According to the CFTC, it "was not only a question of having adequate liquid money on hand to meet client withdrawals."
As a result of Alameda's appropriation, Bankman-Fried. And other officials acknowledged to one another that "FTX customer cash were gone."
It was an admission that contradicted every public assertion Bankman-Fried made up to the day of his arrest, a month later.
The deficit increased from $1 billion to $8 billion by November 8th. For a rescue plan, Bankman-Fried has been soliciting outside investors.
All client withdrawals that day were halted by FTX. The cost of FTT fell by more than 75%. Bankman-Fried was in the middle of a decentralised, high-tech bank takeover. He had no other choice than to resort to Zhao, who revealed that he had signed a "non-binding" letter of intent to purchase FTX.com.
However, on Nov. 9, only one day later, Binance said it would not proceed with the deal. Citing allegations of "mishandled client cash" and government inquiries.
Bankman-Fried announced his resignation as CEO of FTX and related companies two days later. John J. Ray, who managed Enron through its bankruptcy. Was recruited by FTX's longstanding legal counsel at Sullivan & Cromwell. To take over Bankman-previous Fried's role.
FTX declared bankruptcy on November 11 of that year. Bankman-Fried was detained by Bahamian police. A month later in anticipation of his extradition on allegations of fraud, conspiracies, and money laundering.
It seems that Bankman-Fried, a follower of the "effective altruism" school of thought. Was motivated by an obsession with measuring his influence on this world in terms of money and tokens. He created a spreadsheet that quantified the impact Alameda had on the world (and determined it was a net wash).
Due to Bankman-alleged Fried's misdeeds. Millions of dollars in client cash are now floating around in venture capital funds. political war chests, and charitable foundations and might be recouped.
On his own blog, Bankman-Fried questioned , "how much impact can a dollar have?" to his friends and family over ten years ago. He was waxing lyrical about effective altruism.
One two thousandth of a life, he remarked, adding, "Well, if you want a one-sentence response, here it is."
Over $8 billion in consumer money, according to the CFTC, are allegedly gone. Some clients lost their whole life savings, money for their children's education, and future down payments. According to Bankman-own Fried's calculations, his alleged wrongdoings cost four million lives.
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